

## Case 1

### The Northern Rock Bank Run

In the latter part of the summer of 2007, the fall in US house prices and the related implosion of the US sub-prime mortgage market became the catalyst for a global liquidity crisis. Banks began to hoard cash and refused to lend to other banks at anything other than extremely punitive interest rates through the interbank market. This caused severe difficulties for a UK mortgage bank, Northern Rock. Northern Rock's mortgage book had expanded rapidly in the preceding years as it borrowed aggressively from the money markets. It is now clear that this expansion was at the expense of loan quality. The then UK regulatory authority, the Financial Services Authority (FSA), later reported in 2008 that Northern Rock's lending practices did not pay due regard to either the credit quality of the mortgagees or the values of the properties on which the mortgages were secured. Being at the worst end of banking practice, and relying heavily on international capital markets for its funding, Northern Rock was therefore very susceptible to a global reduction in liquidity. As the liquidity crisis took hold, Northern Rock found that it could not replace its maturing money market borrowings. On 12 September 2007, in desperate need of liquidity, Northern Rock's board approached the UK central bank to ask for the necessary funds.

However, the news of Northern Rock's perilous liquidity position became known by the public and, more pertinently, by Northern Rock's retail depositors. On 14 September, having heard the news, queues began to form outside Northern Rock branches as depositors tried to withdraw their savings. On that day, it was estimated that Northern Rock depositors withdrew around £1bn, representing 5 percent of Northern Rock's deposits. Further panic ensued as investors in "internet only" Northern Rock accounts could not withdraw their money because of the collapse of Northern Rock's website. A further £1bn was withdrawn over the next two days.

Northern Rock's share price dropped rapidly, as did the share prices of other similar UK banks. The crisis therefore threatened to engulf more than one bank. To prevent contagion, the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced on 17 September that the UK government would guarantee all Northern Rock deposits. This announcement was enough to stabilize the situation, and given that lending to Northern Rock was now just like lending to the government, deposits actually started to rise again.

Eventually Northern Rock was nationalized by the UK government, with the hope that at some time in the future it could be privatized once its balance sheet had been repaired.

Central banks are also often charged by the government to supervise the banking system, or at least to supervise those banks that they license to accept deposits. However, in some countries, this role is undertaken by a separate authority. In other countries, the central bank can be jointly responsible with another body for the supervision of its banks.

## Case 2

### A Stylized Representation of the Monetary Transmission Mechanism

**Source: Bank of England.**

Suppose that a central bank announces an increase in its official interest rate. The implementation of the policy may begin to work through the economy via four interrelated channels. Those channels include bank lending rates, asset prices, agents' expectations, and exchange rates. First, as described above, the base rates of commercial banks and interbank rates should rise in response to the increase in the official rate. Banks would, in turn, increase the cost of borrowing for individuals and companies over both short- and long-term horizons. Businesses and consumers would then tend to borrow less as interest rates rise. An increase in short-term interest rates could also cause the price of such assets as bonds or the value of capital projects to fall as the discount rate for future cash flows rises.

Market participants would then come to the view that higher interest rates will lead to slower economic growth, reduced profits, and reduced borrowing to finance asset purchases. Exporters' profits might decline if the rise in interest rates causes the country's exchange rate to appreciate, because this would make domestic exports more expensive to overseas buyers and dampen demand to purchase them. The fall in asset prices as well as an increase in prices would reduce household financial wealth and therefore lead to a reduction in consumption growth. Expectations regarding interest rates can play a significant role in the economy. Often companies and individuals will make investment and purchasing decisions based on their interest rate expectations, extrapolated from recent events. If the central bank's interest rate move is widely expected to be followed by other interest rate increases, investors and companies will act accordingly. Consumption, borrowing, and asset prices may all decline as a result of the revision in expectations.

There is a whole range of interconnected ways in which a rise in the central bank's policy rate can reduce real domestic demand and net external demand (that is, the difference between export and import consumption). Weaker total demand would tend to put downward pressure on the rate of domestic inflation—as would a stronger currency, which would reduce the prices of imports. Taken together, these might begin to put downward pressure on the overall measure of inflation.

## **Case 3**

### **The Limits of Monetary Policy: The Case of Japan**

#### **The Background**

Between the 1950s and 1980s, Japan's economy achieved faster real growth than any other G7 economy. But the terrific success of the economy sowed the seeds of the problems that were to follow. The very high real growth rates achieved by Japan over four decades became built in to asset prices, particularly equity and commercial property prices. Toward the end of the 1980s, asset prices rose to even higher levels when the Bank of Japan followed a very easy monetary policy as it tried to prevent the Japanese yen from appreciating too much against the US dollar. However, when interest rates went up in 1989–1990 and the economy slowed, investors eventually came to believe that the growth assumptions that were built in to asset prices and other aspects of the Japanese economy were unrealistic. This realization caused Japanese asset prices to collapse. For example, the Nikkei 225 stock market index reached 38,915 in 1989; by the end of March 2003, it had fallen by 80 percent to 7,972. The collapse in asset prices caused wealth to decline dramatically. Consumer confidence understandably fell sharply too, and consumption growth slowed. Corporate spending also fell, while bank lending contracted sharply in the weak economic climate. Although many of these phenomena are apparent in all recessions, the situation was made worse when deflation set in. In an environment when prices are falling, consumers may put off discretionary spending today until tomorrow; by doing this, however, they exacerbate the deflationary environment. Deflation also raises the real value of debts; as deflation takes hold, borrowers find the real value of their debts rising and may try to increase their savings accordingly. Once again, such actions exacerbate the recessionary conditions.

#### **The Monetary Policy Response**

Faced with such a downturn, the conventional monetary policy response is to cut interest rates to try to stimulate real economic activity. The Japanese central bank, the Bank of Japan, cut rates from 8 percent in 1990 to 1 percent by 1996. By February 2001, the Japanese policy rate was cut to zero where it stayed.

Once rates are at or near zero, there are two broad approaches suggested by theory, though the two are usually complementary. First, the central bank can try to convince markets that interest rates will remain low for a long time, even after the economy and inflation pick up. This will tend to lower interest rates along the yield curve. Second, the central bank can try to increase the money supply by purchasing assets from the private sector, so-called quantitative easing. The Bank of Japan (BoJ) did both in 2001. It embarked on a program of quantitative easing supplemented by an explicit promise not to raise short-term interest rates until deflation had given way to inflation.

Quantitative easing simply involves the printing of money by the central bank. In practice, this involved the BoJ using open market operations to add reserves to the banking system through the direct purchase of government securities in the open market.

The reserve levels became the new target. The BoJ's monetary policy committee determined the level of reserves and the quantity of bond purchases that should be undertaken, rather than voting on the policy rate.

The success of this policy is difficult to judge. As the chart below shows, although deflation turned to inflation for a while, it returned to deflation in 2008–2009 when the Japanese economy suffered a sharp recession along with much of the rest of the world. At that time, having reversed its QE policy during 2004–2008 by reducing its bond holdings, the Bank of Japan began to buy again.

Economists debate the point, but arguably, the Bank of Japan needed to implement a much larger program of QE to eliminate deflation. Japan's program amounted to a cumulative 7–8 percent of GDP spread over three years, whereas the United States and United Kingdom implemented programs totaling 12 percent and 14 percent, respectively, in about one year between 2009 and 2010. The Japanese experience suggests that there may be limits to the power of monetary policy.